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“When Harvey Met Sally”: A Simple Introduction
to a Complicated Problem

“There is power in unity and there is power in numbers. As long
as we keep moving like we are moving, the power
structure . . . will have to give in.”1

Once there was a man named Harvey.2 Harvey runs a
successful public relations firm, and recently hired Sally as an
intern. Sally was twenty-one years old, fresh out of college, and
dreamt of running her own PR firm. Harvey told her she could
shadow him to learn the ropes and generally help around the office.
Sally was over-the-moon; she grew to see Harvey as a mentor. She
happily accepts his friend request on Facebook. And she has no
issue following him back on Instagram. She was not even dismayed
when he randomly liked a two-year-old photo of her at the beach.
She worked with Harvey every day, and he was always very
friendly!
Occasionally, her work kept her in the office later than the rest
of the staff. On one of those nights, Harvey asked Sally if she
wanted to have a drink in his office. She agreed, and they began to
talk—about her hopes, dreams, family. Her love life. A couple of
hours, and more than a few drinks later, Sally thanked Harvey and
turned to go. But as she was leaving, she felt his hand on her
shoulder. Then, he pressed against her. And she froze. Harvey
asked her to stay. She squeaked out a no. And she ran.3
Sexual harassment manifests as an abuse of power.4
Harassers are not typically sexual deviants or addicts; they want
1. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Keep on Moving, Speech at St. Luke’s Baptist
Church in Birmingham, Ala. (May, 1963).
2. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are
purely products of the author’s imagination. Any resemblance to actual persons,
living or dead, or actual events is entirely coincidental.
3. Of course, sexual harassment is rarely this cut-and-dry. While traditional
quid pro quo harassment is the most striking—and perhaps the most focused on—
form, harassment is like a disease. It festers and grows in aberrant conditions. And,
rather than being this explicit, can manifest as a general feeling of helplessness
against a tirade of sexual jokes, unwanted hugs, and backhanded praise.
4. One study found that the three “forms” of sexual harassment—quid pro quo,
hostile environment, and harassment by a third party—are simply manifest from
different bases of power. Abuse of individual power leads to quid pro quo;
organization power to hostile environment; and societal power to third-party
harassment. Paula M. Popovich & Michael A. Warren, The Role of Power in Sexual
Harassment as a Counterproductive Behavior in Organizations, 20 HUM. RESOURCE
MGMT. REV. 45, 49 (2010).
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control.5 The #MeToo movement is a natural backlash against that
power dynamic. Men and women, many of whom feel isolated and
alone, form a community of the harassed. Social media amplifies
their voices; “#MeToo” collects them together.6 Though some were
surprised at the sheer volume of stories, 7 the disenfranchised have
always found power in community. 8

5. Studies have also shown it is those who are chronically denied power that
exhibit a stronger desire to feel powerful, and thus are more likely to use sexual
aggression towards that end. Melissa J. Williams, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, & Lucia E.
Guillory, Sexual Aggression When Power Is New: Effects Acute High Power on
Chronically Low-Power Individuals, 112 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 204–
14 (2017). Some analysts hypothesize that is why men in supervisory roles are more
likely to harass their female colleagues, rather than women they directly supervise:
“harassment [i]s an ‘equalizer’ against women supervisors, consistent with research
showing that harassment is less about sexual desire than about control and
domination.” McLaughlin et. al, Sexual Harassment, Workplace Authority, and the
Paradox of Power, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 625, 641 (2012).
6. Alyssa Milano was credited with creating the hashtag when she wrote “[i]f
all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too’ as a
status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” Nadia
Khomami, #MeToo: How a Hashtag Became a Rallying Cry Against Sexual
Harassment, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2017, 1:13 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2017/oct/20/women-worldwide-use-hashtag-metoo-against-sexual-harassmen
t [https://perma.cc/3KBA-B623]. However, activist Tarana Burke came up with the
“Me Too” designator back in 2006, which she used to refer to her wider movement to
help survivors of sexual harassment and assault. Abby Ohlheiser, The Woman
Behind ‘Me Too’ Knew the Power of the Phrase when She Created It – 10 Years Ago,
WASH. POST (Oct. 29, 2017, 7:38 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2017/10/19/the-woman-behind-me-too-knew-the-power-of-the-phrasewhen-she-created-it-10-years-ago/ [https://perma.cc/7NDT-QYJA].
7. It is normally men, rather than women, who are surprised by these stories.
Mario Small, a sociologist that studies support networks, believes this is partly due
to the fact that sexual harassment is one of those incidents that is “too painful to risk
the possibility that our confidant, the person we are very close to, might say or do
the wrong thing . . . . [W]omen have reason to be unsure how a close male might
respond. Many of us men have been harassed, sexually assaulted, or stalked. But for
almost none of us is the experience as pervasive, persistent or routine as it is for
women.” Mario Small, What ‘Me Too’ Can Teach Men Who Are Willing to Listen,
TIME (Oct. 19, 2017), http://time.com/4988137/me-too-men-listen/ [https://
perma.cc/2HRN-5TAH].
8. Critical theorists have long recognized the importance of community. When
“[t]hose injured by racism and other forms of oppression discover that they are not
alone and moreover are part of a legacy of resistance . . . . [t]hey become empowered
participants, hearing their own stories and the stories of others, listening to how the
arguments against them are framed and learning to make the arguments to defend
themselves.” Tara J. Yosso, Whose Culture Has Capital? A Critical Race Theory
Discussion of Community Cultural Wealth, 8 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 69, 75 (2005).
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Sexual harassment is a blight on modern society.9 And it is far
too prevalent.10 GfK, a market-research group, and the University
of California San Diego interviewed two-thousand men and women
in 2017, and discovered “81% of women and 43% of men reported
experiencing some form of sexual harassment and/or assault in
their lifetime.”11 Thirty-eight percent of those women—and thirteen
percent of the men—were harassed at work.12
Yet sexual harassment remains grossly underreported. 13 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) believes
“approximately 70% of individuals who experienced harassment”
never file a formal complaint or speak with a supervising
authority.14 Perhaps that is because around 75% of employees who
speak out reported some form of retaliation. 15 Regardless, the gap
between experience and reports—as well as the high prevalence of

9. Economists typically agree that sexual harassment presents a net drain on
resources, but it also harms people in ways that are difficult to quantify. Lynn
Parramore, #MeToo: The Economic Cost of Sexual Harassment, INST. FOR NEW ECON.
THINKING (Jan. 2018), https://www.ineteconomics.org/research/research-papers
/metoo-the-economic-cost-of-sexual-harassment [https:/perma.cc/9MD9-9A4A].
10. These meetings do already exist—albeit post-complaint—and they are rarely
enjoyable for those involved. Having a machine, rather than a person, prompt these
meetings could embolden the representative. Rather than explain why a co-worker
filed a complaint, she simply has to say the program flagged the issue, and she can
then empathize and work through the incident with the would-be harasser. As Scalia
once wrote “[t]he chances that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant
duty are greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear
principle . . . .” Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1180 (1989). STOP ST. HARASSMENT, NATIONAL STUDY ON SEXUAL
HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT 7 (Jan. 2018), http://www.stopstreetharassment.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Full-Report-2018-National-Study-on-Sexual-Harassmentand-Assault.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4U9-K2JP].
11. Id.
12. Id. at 8. A study from 2015 with a much smaller sample size reached similar
conclusions. Alanna Vagianos, 1 in 3 Women Has Been Sexually Harassed at Work,
According to Survey, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 2015, 4:34 PM), https://www.huffp
ost.com/entry/1-in-3-women-sexually-harassed-work-cosmopolitan_n_6713814
[https://perma.cc/6N6Y-PJ7Y].
13. CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N, SELECT TASKFORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 16
(June 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/upload/report.pdf
[https: perma.cc/V8B3-9E6H].
14. Id.
15. Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation:
Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 255 (2003). Interestingly, the authors of the study expanded
retaliation beyond the well-studied realm of tangible workplace actions to encompass
social retaliation, including “harassment, name-calling, ostracism, blame, threats, or
the ‘silent treatment.’” Id. at 248.
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retaliation—is evidence of obvious problems in sexual harassment
law.
But what could employers do? Around 70% of employers
already offer training; 98% of companies have adopted a written
sexual harassment policy.16 Yet harassment continues, even in
companies with some of the clearest and most confidential
reporting.17 Often humans are the root of failure—"sexual
harassment policies . . . are only as good as the managers who
implement them and are responsible for making sure there is broad
compliance.”18
This paper explores a deceptively obvious solution to human
error; removing the human. While unthinkable even a few years
ago, Artificial Intelligence may present a road to this end. And, with
it, plenty of potholes and hazards to trip those with even the purest
intentions. The law lumbers forward while technology sprints; a
system as envisioned in this article might be inevitable, but earlyadopters must appreciate the uncharted waters they navigate.
Section II first explores the current state of sexual harassment law,
and why it fails the harassed. Section III then examines one
possible solution—training Artificial Intelligence to recognize
sexual harassment. Section IV then explores the legal implications

16. Stefanie K. Johnson, Jessica F. Kirk, & Ksenia Keplinger, Why We Fail to
Report Sexual Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 4, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/10
/why-we-fail-to-report-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/939C-W653].
17. For instance, 21st Century Fox maintains a confidential sexual harassment
hotline. And yet, despite the abundance of sexual harassment allegations now
swirling around Bill O’Reilly, no one ever reported him using the hotline. Sarah
Kessler, Corporate Sexual Harassment Hotlines Don’t Work. They’re Not Designed to,
QUARTZ AT WORK (May 2, 2017), https://work.qz.com/971112/corporate-sexualharassment-hotlines-dont-work-theyre-not-designed-to [https://perma.cc/89YV-JWE
Q].
18. Barbara Ortutay, Can Better Policies Prevent Workplace Sexual
Harassment?, AP NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/45ff9a0e936e43
c6a9fad9f892b7872e [https://perma.cc/6X62-MLGN] (quote from Dan Eaton). Of
course, there are plenty of other solutions. Microsoft recently rescinded forced
arbitration of sexual harassment claims, encouraging those who experience
harassment to seek relief. Chris Morris, Microsoft Changes Its Sexual Harassment
Policies in the Wake of #MeToo, FORTUNE (Dec. 19, 2017, 8:33 AM),
http://fortune.com/2017/12/19/microsoft-changes-sexual-harassment-policies/
[https://perma.cc/2YDG-UZ2H]. Google uses unconscious bias training to educate
employees on recognizing issues within their own behavior. Renzo Costarella, These
Companies Are Battling Sexual Harassment by Teaching Employees to Recognize
Unconscious Bias, ENTREPRENEUR (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.entrepreneur.
com/article/305324 [https:// perma.cc/4BQY-DD5B]. And bystander training remains
a popular option for tackling the issues of underreporting. Johnson, Kirk, &
Keplinger, supra note 16.

74

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

of such a system, both in expanding sexual harassment law and its
implications for privacy, reputation, and workplace comradery.

II. “The Fault in Our Prongs”: Why Current Law Fails the
Harassed
“I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. Just kiss. I don’t
even wait. And when you’re a star, they let you do it. You can
do anything . . . . Grab ‘em by the pussy. You can do
anything.”19

Title VII’s purpose is—and always was—prophylactic.
Congress was not trying to provide victims redressability. 20 Rather,
Congress wished to “assure equality of employment opportunities
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered” barriers like those built on race and sex.21 To achieve
that, it “arm[ed] the courts with full equitable powers” to “make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful
employment discrimination.”22 Redressability would, in turn,
“influence primary conduct” to “avoid harm.” 23 Harassment costs
businesses money, and money motivates change.24 Oddly, slightly
misguided jurisprudence has muddled this harm-avoidance
principle.
A. Sexual Harassment is Not a Character Flaw
Title VII’s language is deceptively clear—”[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s . . . sex . . . .”25 In other words, employers cannot

19. Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcrip
t.html [https://perma.cc/QAC6-LW55] (quote from Donald J. Trump).
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
21. Id. (emphasis added).
22. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
23. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805–06 (1998).
24. See Parramore, supra note 9.
25. 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). Conventional wisdom holds Congress added
sex discrimination at the eleventh hour as a joke. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1971) (“The amendment adding the word
‘sex’ to ‘race, color, religion and national origin’ was adopted one day before House
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discriminate against someone because of their sex. But the first
courts to adjudicate sexual harassment under Title VII grappled
with this idea that harassment was, itself, a form of
discrimination.26 Instead, Title VII was meant to “strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes.”27 Handsy managers, to these early courts,
had little to do with sex stereotypes.28
Barnes v. Train was the first opinion to consider sexual
harassment under Title VII.29 Plaintiff “refused to engage in a
sexual affair with her supervisor,”30 and was belittled, harassed,
and eventually fired as a result. 31 But, to the Barnes court,
“[r]egardless of how inexcusable the conduct of plaintiff’s supervisor
might have been, it does not evidence an arbitrary barrier to
continued employment based on plaintiff’s sex.”32 Instead, the
harassment was a “controversy underpinned by the subtleties of an
inharmonious personal relationship.”33
Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. was the first reported case
considering sexual harassment under Title VII. 34 Again, the facts
outline a clear claim. Plaintiffs Corne and DeVane were clerical
workers and “repeatedly subjected to verbal and physical sexual
advances from defendant Price[,]” which made work so intolerable

passage of the Civil Rights Act. It was added on the floor and engendered little
relevant debate.”). However, this popular account has been revealed as a “misleading
and harmful” reduction of hard-fought rights. Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex
Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 1020 (2015).
26. See Barnes v. Train, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *3; Corne v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D. Ariz. 1975).
27. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971).
28. This approach, while wrong, is more conservative and evidences the Court’s
general unwillingness to target personal behavior. Private employers were within
the purview of the statute—private people were not.
29. Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimination of
Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1007, 1007 n.3
(1978).
30. Barnes, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *3. The original opinion was fairly
scant, but the appellate decision overturning Barnes is thankfully more detailed.
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 984–86 (1977).
31. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 984–86.
32. Barnes, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7212, at *3 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). Barnes was
not widely known until it was overturned in 1977. Instead, Corne was the first
reported case of “a sexual harassment claim under Title VII,” and the first to gain
any notoriety. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN 60 (1979).
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that they left.35 But the court denied them relief, concluding “Price’s
conduct appears to be nothing more than a personal proclivity,
peculiarity[,] or mannerism.”36
These courts were correct on one count—Title VII is
prophylactic. It is meant to “make careers open to talents
irrespective of race or sex,” rather than simply providing redress for
injuries.37 Lawsuits are a means to that end, rather than the end
itself. But when the company “can only be damaged by the very
nature of the acts complained of,” 38 Title VII is irrelevant as
motivation to correct poor behavior already exists.39
It was not until the mid-seventies that district courts began
changing their tune. Williams v. Saxbe signaled this shift in its
groundbreaking finding that a male supervisor’s retaliatory acts
could “create[] an artificial barrier to employment . . . placed before
one gender and not the other[.]”40 However, the court refused to
equate sexual harassment and discrimination as a matter of law;
rather, it was up to the fact-finder to determine whether
harassment was “a policy or a regulation of the office . . . [or] an
isolated personal incident.”41

35. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 162.
36. Id. at 163.
37. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976)
overruled by Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
This lower court’s opinion neatly summarizes the general view of Title VII under
early jurisprudence:
Title VII was enacted in order to remove those artificial barriers to full
employment which are based upon unjust and long-encrusted prejudice. Its
aim is to make careers open to talents irrespective of race or sex. It is not
intended to provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical
attack motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which
happened to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley.
Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556.
38. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163.
39. The court required “discriminatory conduct . . . ar[i]se out of company
policies” where “[t]here was apparently some advantage to, or gain by, the employer
from such discriminatory practices.” Id. Interestingly, the Corne court’s concerns
mirror many voiced about the #MeToo Movement: namely that “an outgrowth of
holding such activity to be actionable under Title VII would be a potential federal
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances
toward another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be
to have employees who were asexual.” Id. at 163–64.
40. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976).
41. Id. at 660. A similar decision appeared in the Fourth Circuit in Garber v.
Saxon Bus. Prod’s, wherein the appellate court found the complaint, liberally
construed, could show “an employer policy or acquiescence in a practice of compelling
female employees to submit to the sexual advances of their male supervisors . . . .”
552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977).
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The Third Circuit in Tomkins distilled the key difference
between earlier cases and recent decisions like Saxbe, by focusing
on adverse action.42 Harassment moves away from personal conflict
and towards discrimination once “direct employment consequences
flow[] from the advances[.]”43 And, in the court’s opinion,
foreshadowed the eventual legal framework under which Title VII
operates.44 Once (1) “a supervisor,” (2) with “actual or constructive
knowledge of the employer,” (3) “makes sexual advances or
demands toward a subordinate[,]” and (4) “conditions that
employee’s job status . . . on a favorable response to those
advances[,]” Title VII is violated as a matter of law unless (5) “the
employer . . . take[s] prompt and appropriate remedial action after
acquiring such knowledge.”45
Confusion, rather than clarity, unfortunately reigned postTomkins. Many courts focused unnecessarily on the harasser’s
supervisory authority; unless the harasser expressly conditioned
continued employment on acquiescence and had the authority to
follow through on his threat, the harassment claim failed. 46 Others
happily permitted a Title VII claim, even when the harassment
came from a co-worker, as long as the employer knew about it and
did not step in.47 Inconsistent application led the EEOC to issue new
guidelines in 1980 declaring both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment claims are actionable sex
discrimination.48

42. Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1046.
43. Id. at 1048.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1048–49.
46. See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979) (dismissing
because the plaintiff, a professor fired after refusing “to accede to the romantic
overtures” of her academic department’s chairman, could not state a Title VII claim
as she failed to allege the chairman had any “authority to terminate her employment
or effectively recommend the same”); Clark v. World Airways, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15379, at *8–9 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1980) (noting “explicit sexual advances” made by a
company’s president towards an employee were not actionable because the president
“did not at any time relate submission to his advances to any of plaintiff’s
employment prospects”); Smith v. Rust Eng’g Co., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14718, at
*3 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 1978) (holding that “acquiescence in the sexual advances” of a
co-worker was not “impliedly or expressly required as a condition of employment”
and thus Plaintiff could not base her Title VII claim on that harassment).
47. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 924–36 (D.N.J. 1978)
(employer violated Title VII when it learned plaintiff’s co-workers “created an
obscene cartoon” to “humiliate her, AS a woman,” but failed to take remedial action).
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1981).
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The EEOC identified that all of these courts were effectively
enshrining principles of “respondeat superior . . . that an employer
is responsible for the acts of its supervisors and agents” in a sexual
harassment context.49 Obviously, that meant harassment by an
employer’s direct agent imputed liability to the company. But it also
meant the company could be liable for harassment by nonsupervisory employees, as long as the company knew about it and
did nothing.50
These guidelines lay the root of all modern sexual harassment
litigation, and their dual-concerns evidences the inherent conflict
this paper seeks to address. The guidelines’ “major thrust” is
“[p]revention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual
harassment.”51 Litigation was the stick; prevention the carrot. Once
the employer “knows of acts of sexual harassment . . . and rectifies
the actual results of those actions,” workers could no longer wield
the stick.52
B. The Prongs Cometh
As noted by the Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, “[s]ince the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly
held” an employer violates Title VII either when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate, or the employer knowingly
permits “a hostile or abusive work environment” based on sex. 53
Rectifying sexual harassment is key to removing “arbitrary
barrier[s] to sexual equality at the workplace.” 54 After all, the harm
of sexual harassment extends beyond economic injury as “run[ning]
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning and
disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.” 55

49. Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 1981: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Labor and Human Res. 97th. Cong. 393 (1981) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of
J. Clay Smith Jr., Acting Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n).
50. “However, where both knowledge and control do exist on the part of the
employer, there is an obligation under [T]itle VII for the employer to maintain an
atmosphere that is free of sexual harassment, so that members of one sex are not
required to work under different and less advantageous terms and conditions of
employment than members of the other sex.” Id. at 340.
51. Id. at 341.
52. As noted by the EEOC, “the Commission would not sue for a remedy which
has already been granted.” Id. at 340.
53. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
54. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
55. Id.
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Encouraging employers who willingly dismantle that gauntlet
by adopting prophylactic measures, then, is a legitimate goal. And
the legally recognized affirmative defenses to sexual harassment
are meant to push employers down that road. Originally, employers
had one defense—remedial action.56 Once an employer rectifies a
problem, there is no reason to “sue for a remedy which has already
been granted.”57 This defense still exists when a plaintiff’s coworkers commit the harassment.58
However, when the alleged harasser is an employee’s
supervisor, courts disagreed on whether absolute liability attached
under the theory of respondeat superior, or if a defense was still
available.59 In Meritor, the Supreme Court denounced any absolute
rule, and instead instructed lower courts “to look to agency
principles for guidance in this area.”60 This instruction led to chaotic
results until,61 in the late nineties, the Supreme Court created a
new affirmative defense.62 First, it recognized absolute liability
attached when a supervisor sexually harasses an employee, and
subsequently takes adverse action against her.63 But, when there is

56. Hearing, supra note 49, at 351.
57. Id.
58. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1986) (“With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action.”).
59. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793 (1998).
60. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (1986).
61. The instruction led to three approaches to vicarious liability rooted in agency
principles. An employer could be vicariously liable when (1) “supervisors were acting
within the scope of their employment when they engaged in the harassing conduct”;
(2) “they were significantly aided by the agency relationship in committing the
harassment”; or (3) the employer had actual or constructive “knowledge of the
harassment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775, 793. Some circuits would refuse to attach
vicarious liability to conduct “motivated solely by individual desires and serves no
purpose of the employer” while others focused more heavily on foreseeability and
whether the “sexual misconduct arose from or was in some way related to the
employee’s essential duties.” Id. at 776, 796.
62. This defense was explained in companion cases Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742 (1998), and Faragher, 524 U.S. at 775.
63. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. Interestingly, even postEllerth, not every state patterned their sexual harassment jurisprudence on Title
VII. Until recently, New Jersey attached strict liability to supervisor harassment
even without an adverse employment action. Aguas v. State, 107 A.3d 1250, 1278
(N.J. 2015) (Albin, J., dissenting) (“Until today, the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense standard was foreign to our . . . jurisprudence . . . [which] makes no such
distinction between tangible employment actions and sexual harassment that may
cause physical or psychological harm to the employee.”).
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no adverse action, an employer may avoid liability by showing (1)
they “exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior”; and (2) “that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer.”64
The two requirements of an Ellerth/Farragher defense creates
different obligations for each party; for simplicity’s sake, this paper
refers to each obligation as prongs one through three.65 The first
prong
obliges
employers
use
“reasonable
care
to
prevent . . . sexually harassing behavior.”66 Prong two mandates
employers minimize harm once it occurs. 67 And, if these prongs are
met, prong three’s burden shifts to plaintiff to prove they either took
advantage of preventative measures, or their failure to do so was
reasonable.68
C. Shouldering Your Burden
Courts have recognized sexual harassment as a form of sex
discrimination for nearly thirty years. And yet, as the #MeToo
movement shows, harassment remains one of the largest arbitrary
barriers to gender equality in the workplace. So what went wrong?
Some analysts blame the defense itself. They derisively dub it
the “file cabinet defense,” requiring employers do little beyond
“promulgat[ing] an anti-harassment policy that specifically
addresses sexual harassment and a grievance procedure that allows
an employee to bypass a harassing supervisor.” 69 As long as you
64. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
65. Traditionally, there are only two prongs of the Ellerth/Faragher defense: (1)
The employer must use reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior;
and (2) the employee must take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. However, one of the biggest failings of
sexual harassment law, in the author’s opinion, if this tendency to group prevention
and correction together. Prevention must remain the end-goal; correction simply fills
the gaps.
66. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
67. Id.
68. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
69. Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 210 (2004) (“My concern was
well-founded. An examination of 200 federal court cases addressing the new Ellerth
and Faragher affirmative defense reveals that many federal courts have interpreted
the Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher to require little more than what the
Court in Meritor commanded: promulgate an anti-harassment policy that specifically
addresses sexual harassment and a grievance procedure that allows an employee to
bypass a harassing supervisor. As a practical matter, the Court’s decisions in Ellerth
and Faragher did little to change employer incentives to reduce the incidence of
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have a file cabinet for these claims, the employee bears the burden
of acting. A fairer assessment views this as a “notice” requirement,70
as exists in some premises liability cases.71 A landlord has a duty to
monitor for hazardous conditions but, as long as that duty is
satisfied, she is not liable for injury caused by unknown conditions.
But requiring notice is futile when employees refuse to report.
There is a deep fear of retaliation.72 Seventy-six percent of those
who report harassment experience retaliation, which certainly
hinders others from reporting.73 Indeed, as one analyst notes, “if the
vast majority of harassment victims do not report harassment, then
the reasonable response is not to report harassment.”74 The
reporting requirement stems from tort-principles of mitigation; a
victim is only blameless as long as damage is unavoidable. 75 Harmavoidance should certainly remain part of a court’s analysis, but
current laws unnecessarily constrain harm-avoidance to formal
reporting.76 And, as a result, many stories go unheard.
sexual harassment by supervisors in the workplace.”).
70. The Ninth Circuit nicely summarized the notice requirement as follows:
Notice of the sexually harassing conduct triggers an employer’s duty to take
prompt corrective action that is ‘reasonably calculated to end the
harassment.’ This obligation actually has two parts. The first consists of the
temporary steps the employer takes to deal with the situation while it
determines whether the complaint is justified. The second consists of the
permanent remedial steps the employer takes once it has completed its
investigation.
Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).
71. The Americans with Disabilities Act provides another analogous legal
mechanism. Designed to “eliminat[e] . . . discrimination against individuals with
disabilities;” the ADA requires an employer provide “reasonable accommodations” to
help a disabled but otherwise qualified individual to do their job. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)
(2018). However, “[a]n employee has the initial duty to inform the employer of a
disability before ADA liability may be triggered for failure to provide
accommodations—a duty dictated by common sense lest a disabled employee keep
his disability a secret and sue later for failure to accommodate.” Beck v. Univ. of Wis.
Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1996).
72. Johnson, Kirk, & Keplinger, supra note 16.
73. See id.; See also Cortina & Magley, supra note 15, at 255 (finding that only
34% of those who reported harassment did not experience any form of retaliation).
74. Lawton, supra note 69, at 209.
75. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“Title VII borrows
from tort law the avoidable consequences doctrine, . . . and the considerations which
animate that doctrine would also support the limitation of employer liability in
certain circumstances.”).
76. Margaret Johnson explores this phenomenon in depth, noting “the acts taken
to ‘avoid harm’ from sexual harassment are more diverse than filing a formal
complaint of sexual harassment.” Margaret E. Johnson, “Avoiding Harm Otherwise”:
Reframing Women Employees’ Responses to the Harms of Sexual Harassment, 80
TEMP. L. REV. 743, 771 (2007). Johnson suggests lawmakers and judges look beyond
formal reporting mechanisms and recognize how “more complete stories can be told
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Further, harassment is not a one-size-fits-all problem. Not all
misconduct is actionable, nor do all employees perceive harassment
the same way. Disagreement abounds, even within the #MeToo
movement.77 No one really knows when, exactly, a compliment
crosses the line into harassment. 78 There are simply too many
subjective elements.
Scholars have proposed different solutions to these two
problems. Some suggest a new reasonableness standard, permitting
juries to determine the reasonableness of an employee’s failure to
report.79 Others argue the standard should remain with the
employer, requiring it prove it acted reasonably in trying to prevent
harassment.80 But these solutions overlook an interesting quality of
sexual harassment law. The interests of the employer and employee
are not diametrically opposed. Sexual harassment harms both. 81 A
cooperative system that recognizes allies (the harassed and the
employer) and the problem (the harasser) could solve
underreporting. Retaliation and confusion shrink against a
company’s vast resources and honest support. Perhaps, then, it is
reasonable to expect the employer do more in helping employees
avoid harm.

and made available for determinations pursuant to the liability framework for
supervisor sexual harassment.” Id. at 806.
77. Fiona Chen, Why the Aziz Ansari Story and Discussions of Grey Areas Are
Central to the #MeToo Movement, TECH (Jan. 25, 2018), https://thetech.com/2018/01
/25/me-too-aziz-ansari [perma.cc/B8FM-69YV].
78. Akshita Jha & Radhiki Mamidi, When Does a Compliment Become Sexist?
Analysis and Classification of Ambivalent Sexism Using Twitter Data, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SECOND WORKSHOP ON NAT. LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND COMPUTATIONAL
SOC. SCI. 7 (2017) (“Previous works on computationally detecting sexism present
online are restricted to identifying the hostile form. Our objective is to investigate
the less pronounced form of sexism demonstrated online.”).
79. Heather S. Murr, The Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers
Strictly Liable for Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 635 (2006).
80. Robert R. Graham III, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Need to Revisit
the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
423, 446 (2016) (“An employee’s reporting of harassing behavior creates a rebuttable
presumption of liability that shifts the burden to the defendant employer to prove
that it acted reasonably in its efforts to prevent and remedy the harassment at
issue.”).
81. See Parramore, supra note 9.
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III. “Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?”: Teaching the
Robot
“Did you know that my love is a liquid? I could talk to me for
years. I can’t speak to you at all. Did you know that friends come
in boxes?”82

At a 1956 conference at Dartmouth College, R.J. Solomonoff
posited “[t]he finding of ‘words’ that have a high and useful
correlation with other ‘words’ has been, by far, the most important
task of science.”83 When someone walks outside and sees dark
clouds, their mind will predict the likelihood of rain because it is
hardwired to recognize patterns. 84 A result—rain—is partly
predictable based on an element—clouds. Add more elements—
temperature, time of day, geography—and a more accurate
prediction follows. According to Solomonoff, programmers could
theoretically create an algorithm to examine elements, identify
corresponding results, and then issue predictions. 85
A. Making Intelligence Artificial: Algorithmic Learning
Artificial Intelligence is an incredibly complex and eclectic
field. Solomonoff was one of ten academics at Dartmouth, and a
schism immediately appeared between the “rigidly logical” but
“immediately applicable” programs, and probabilistic based
programs.86 Systems are, in fact, still categorized as driven by either
logic or probability.87
82. TUBEWAY ARMY, My Love is a Liquid, on TUBEWAY ARMY (Beggars Banquet
Records 1978).
83. Ray Solomonoff, An Inductive Inference Machine, IRE Convention Record,
Section on Information Theory, Part 2, at 2 (1957).
84. Or, put another way, “if we observe ‘cloudy weather,’ we expect ‘rainy
weather’ in the immediate space-time neighborhood[—]and vice-versa.” Id.
85. “To make predictions, the machine examines the interrogation square of the
q element, finds a p n-gram that fits the problem, and makes the prediction that
corresponds to that p n-gram.” Id. at 14.
86. Grace Solomonoff, Ray Solomonoff and the New Probability, in ALGORITHMIC
PROBABILITY AND FRIENDS, BAYESIAN PREDICTION AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
PAPERS FROM THE RAY SOLOMONOFF 85TH MEMORIAL CONFERENCE, MELBOURNE,
VIC, AUSTRALIA, NOV./DEC. 2011, 37, 42 (David L. Dowe ed., 2013) (explaining that
logic-based programs are defined by much simpler “if-then” statements; if option a,
then result y, but if option b, result x).
87. See Karthik Guruswamy, Data Science: Machine Learning Vs. Rules Based
Systems, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/teradata/2015/12/
15/data-science-machine-learning-vs-rules-based-systems/#2f5b61b2119a [https://p
erma.cc/5NX6-DSZQ]. However, many programs, like IBM’s Watson, actually use
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The biggest drawback to purely logical programming is the
difficulty in hard-coding knowledge.88 Our world is inherently
complex, and accurately distilling complexity into logical rules is
almost impossible.89 Machines needed to acquire their own
knowledge “by extracting patterns from raw data,” much like
humans do.90 Machine learning is now the most cutting-edge form
of AI as it takes away the human operator, and theoretically
permits a program to simply learn on its own. 91 A machine with
enough computing power can break down even complicated
collections of information and, from those, extract patterns. 92
Pattern extraction is AI’s most interesting feature,
particularly in preventing sexual harassment. AI is exceedingly
good at mapping out extant and predicted relationships based on
these patterns.93 Police departments have dubbed this “predictive
policing,” as their software pores over data to predict potential
criminals, victims, and co-offending networks.94 Credit card
monitoring software pores through billions of transactions for
both. John Rennie, How IBM’s Watson Computer Excels at Jeopardy, PLOS (Feb. 14,
2011), http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs6700/2013sp/readings/01-a-Watson-Short
.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7FJ-TQZ9].
88. See IAN GOODFELLOW ET AL., DEEP LEARNING 2 (2016).
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1–3.
92. Humans already do this subconsciously. Imagine, for instance, a cat. Your
mind can generally predict how a cat looks based on your past interactions with the
animal. But AI programs could not mimic this behavior without first being told what
a cat looked like. Then, in 2012, researchers behind Google Brain discovered their AI
was able to successfully compile a probabilistic image of a cat purely through pattern
recognition after reviewing ten million random video thumbnails. Google’s team
never told the machine that a certain object was a cat. Rather, the machine
recognized the pattern as significant within the majority of the random thumbnails,
and assigned its conception of a cat value. See John Markoff, How Many Computers
to Identify a Cat? 16,000, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/201
2/06/26/technology/in-a-big-network-of-computers-evidence-of-machine-learning.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/W65S-RNHL].
93. See China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Nov. 19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-policebig-data-systems-violate-privacy-target-dissent [https://perma.cc/7WDW-465G].
94. Social media is a treasure trove of data for predicting would-be criminals and
mapping their relationships. See MOHAMMAD A. TAYEBI & UWE GLÄSSER, SOCIAL
NETWORK ANALYSIS IN PREDICTIVE POLICING: CONCEPTS, MODELS AND METHODS 2
(2016). This practice, of course, comes with its own set of problems, including the
implicit bias inherent in any community-based prediction software. Randy Rieland,
Artificial Intelligence Is Now Used to Predict Crime. But Is It Biased?, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/innovation/artificial-intellig
ence-is-now-used-predict-crime-is-it-biased-180968337/ [https://perma.cc/TU5B-S9L
M].
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patterns to indicate someone is a thief or terrorist. 95 The Chinese
Government has used machine-learning programs for nearly
everything, from planning city routes to rooting out political
dissidents.96
Given that a lot of companies are using AI to replace core
functions once left to Human Resources,97 a program that similarly
predicts sexual harassment could be a godsend. Sexual harassment
software already has a place in corporate America. Programs
analyze the content of e-mails to warn users away from sending
potentially harassing messages.98 Advanced Discovery’s new
“Riskcovery” actually uses predefined patterns of sexually
harassing behavior to flag potential harassment. 99 But the problem
with these programs, at least from a preventative perspective, is
they still require harassment to occur, or almost occur, before
sending up a flag. If AI can truly vindicate Title VII’s prophylactic
purpose, it will need to kick in earlier in the process.
B. Can You Teach AI to be Harassed?
Sexual harassment is predictable. Socio-cultural studies prove
researchers can analyze social situations, personalities, and
contextual clues to determine when sexual harassment might

95. See Robert J. O’Harrow, Jr., No Place to Hide, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 35, 45 (2005).
96. See Liza Lin & Josh Chin, China’s Tech Giants Have a Second Job: Helping
Beijing Spy on Its People, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/c
hinas-tech-giants-have-a-second-job-helping-the-government-see-everything-15120
56284 [https://perma.cc/T2CY-439A]; Sam Schechner, Douglas MacMillan, and Liza
Lin, U.S. and Chinese Companies Race to Dominate AI, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18,
2018),https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-u-s-companies-may-lose-the-ai-race-151628
067 [https://perma.cc/T29Y-7UNX].
97. See Jeanne Meister, The Future Of Work: The Intersection of Artificial
Intelligence and Human Resources, FORBES (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.forbes.co
m/sites/jeannemeister/2017/03/01/the-future-of-work-the-intersection-of-artificialintelligence-and-human-resources/2/#49c2b98c67ee [https://perma.cc/XCA4-WRBP];
Ted Greenwald, How AI Is Transforming the Workplace, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ai-is-transforming-the-workplace-1489371060
[https://perma.cc/3CZG-CRJP]; Sam Schechner, Meet Your New Boss: An Algorithm,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-your-new-boss-analgorithm-1512910800 [https://perma.cc/6FJY-GUSP].
98. See Joanna Goodman, Legal Technology: Better Together, LAW SOC’Y
GAZETTE, July 11, 2016, https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/features/legal-technologybetter-together/5056456.article [https://perma.cc/KB4U-KCLS].
99. See Riskcovery & Compliance Risk Assessment, ADVANCED DISCOVERY,
https://www.advanceddiscovery.com/what-we-do-for-you/risk-management-complia
nce/riskcovery-compliance-risk-assessment/ [https://perma.cc/6NNU-RDD6].
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occur.100 The trouble is reducing these highly malleable, subjective
experiences into language understood by the program. Just as
Google Brain had to learn the very concept of a cat,101 so too would
an effective AI need to understand the concept of harassment.
However, few would disagree on the very basic ingredients
necessary in a cat.102 Many disagree as to what constitutes
harassment.103
Subjective experience long-confounded AI researchers as
rudimentary AIs required binary definitions. “Honesty is good,
dishonesty is bad” was a very simple moral game that effectively
ignores subjective experience and context. However, with the
advent of neural networks, there can be ranges with small upticks
between each judgment. And it is here that researchers are having
luck teaching AI about human culture.104 AIs have, in fact, been
taught to accommodate human culture before determining if an act

100. See John B. Pryor et al., A Social Psychological Model for Predicting Sexual
Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 69, 70 (1995).
101. See Markoff, supra note 92.
102. Even if you prefer dogs to cats, you and I probably agree on what a cat looks
like.
103. See Wendy L. Patrick, Sexual Harassment Is in the Eye of the Beholder,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/whybad-looks-good/201703/sexual-harassment-is-in-the-eye-the-beholder [https:// perm
a.cc/PQV3-6H74].
104. Researchers were able to teach a machine to mimic cultural preferences in
negotiation using games. The goal was to move across a colored board to a ‘goal’
square. But moving required surrendering a chip of whatever color adjacent square
you wanted to go to. There were three phases: negotiation, transfer, and movement.
During the negotiation phase, a party could ask the other to surrender chips of a
certain color. If rejected, the other side got to ask. During transfer, you could transfer
however many chips you agreed to, or a subset of that agreement (including none),
allowing you to break the promise. Finally, during the movement phase, you could
move one step if you had the chips. After that, the positions alternated and the next
round would begin. The game ended when a party either didn’t move for three rounds
or reached its goal. The game was then scored by how close each party got to its goal.
See Galit Haim et al., A Cultural Sensitive Agent for Human-Computer Negotiation,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTONOMOUS
AGENTS AND MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 451, 452 (June 2012), http://www.eecs.harvard.
edu/~gal/Papers/pal.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA7T-9KUQ].
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is morally wrong.105 They can simulate guilt,106 flirt,107 and predict
potential suicide risks.108 An AI can even recognize beauty and
music, as long as those components have an assignable value. 109
Title VII is not a civility code,110 which is why a plaintiff cannot
successfully sue over one dirty joke. But the “objective severity of
harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff’s position, considering ‘all the
circumstances.’”111 That standard adds a subjective element. The
first step, then, in designing an AI program for sexual harassment
is teaching it to accommodate subjective experience. Having new
hires play a game with the machine could allow the program to
assign a ‘sensitivity profile’ for each employee.112
C. Designing “An Eye”113 Program
This game cannot simply spit out dirty jokes or potentially
harassing situations and ask new employees to rank their comfort
105. See Ariel Conn, Ethics and Creativity in Artificial Intelligence: An Interview
with Mark Riedl, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.co
m/entry/ethics-and-creativity-in-artificial-intelligence-an_us_593047b4e4b09e93d7
964848 [https://perma.cc/75PY-GRS6]; Using Stories to Teach Human Values to
Artificial Agents, GA. TECH. (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.news.gatech.edu/2016/02
/12/using-stories-teach-human-values-artificial-agents [https://perma.cc/52MB-P6
RY].
106. See Simon Parkin, Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, ECONOMIST:1843
MAG. (June/July 2017), https://www.1843magazine.com/features/teaching-robotsright-from-wrong [https://perma.cc/PGF5-43XR].
107. See Moira Weigel, Flirting with Humanity, NEW REPUBLIC (May 11, 2016),
https://newrepublic.com/article/133034/flirting-humanity [https://perma.cc/6R4WVJPS].
108. See Aili McConnon, AI Helps Identify People at Risk for Suicide, WALL ST. J.
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ai-helps-identify-people-at-risk-forsuicide-1519400853 [https://perma.cc/MW86-7YPW].
109. AI analyzes images and art deemed popular and professional, identifies
common patterns in the art, and then compares new images to what it found. Levi
Manovich, Automating Aesthetics: Artificial Intelligence and Image Culture,
MANOVICH (2017), http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/automating-aesthetics-art
ificial-intelligence-and-image-culture [https://perma.cc/8BZS-XL4X]. As the author
points out though, relying on popular reaction may lead to cultural homogenization.
The same application, and results, could apply to music. George Sims, Will AI
Change the Future of Music?, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Oct. 19, 2017),
http://www.dw.com/en/will-ai-change-the-future-of-music/a-41031406 [https://perm
a.cc/C7SE-AVYT].
110. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (“Title VII,
we have said, does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the American workplace.’”).
111. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
112. See Haim, supra note 104 (explaining that games are an excellent way to help
AI programs understand cultural differences).
113. Please forgive the terrible pun, but the author could not resist the Orwellian
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level.114 Rather, designers should pattern it around the very
personality traits that indicate sensitivity to harassment. One
study actually tracked these personality traits and linked them to
sensitivity.115 Some findings were expected; those with a high sense
of morality or justice may be more sensitive to harassment as they
keenly perceive lapses in decorum. 116 And people of lower
intelligence “tend to be over-sensitive to harassment – both sexual
and non-sexual” as they might lack “enough insight to understand
the subtleties in human behavior” and, “[a]s a result, they may
perceive harassment in certain behaviours when, in fact, the
behaviour may mean something else entirely – humour, for
example.”117
Others were surprising. People who were naturally shy or
withdrawn tended to be less sensitive to sexual harassment, and
more sensitive to other forms of harassment; the authors posited
that these individuals see sexual harassment as something
avoidable through withdrawing from a situation, while other forms
of harassment require immediate action. 118 People who were
outgoing and friendly were, in contrast, highly sensitive to
harassment; the authors posited such “‘free and easy’ styles lead
others to believe that they are not at all sensitive, and to deal with
them more harshly than . . . others.”119
The game, then, should test a person’s propensity for
confrontation, problem-solving skills, and notions of justice.
Something as rudimentary as ‘Cheat,’ wherein both sides may cheat
or call out the other for cheating, could target these traits.120 Of

reference.
114. This approach would effectively require new hires to endure harassing
behavior, albeit from a machine, after being hired.
115. See Stephen M. Crow et al., The Impact of Personality Factors on Sexual and
Non‐sexual Harassment Sensitivity, 10 WOMEN MGMT. REV. 9, 10 (1995).
116. Id. at 15–16.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 15.
120. For those who never played Cheat—also known as “Bullshit,” “Bluff,” and “IDoubt-It”—the game is very simple. The aim is for the player to get rid of all of their
cards. Each player takes turns placing cards face down starting from Aces and
working their way up, but they must state orally what they are purportedly placing
in the pile. For example, the first player will say “two Aces” and place two of their
cards on the pile. The other players may then call the first player’s bluff or the next
player may take their turn. If a player’s bluff is called successfully, that player has
to pick up the pile. But if the player who called you a bluff is wrong, they pick up the
pile.
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course, personality tests are not all created equal. 121 But the more
games the computer plays, the better the sensitivity profile
becomes. That gives the program a base from which to judge
patterns and relationships. Is a supervisor with low-sensitivity
paired with an employee with high-sensitivity? That immediately
raises a red flag, allowing a company to monitor their relationship
closely. Being low-or-high sensitivity is not actionable, and it must
not influence any managerial decisions,122 but rather it lets human
resources know to watch for issues.
The Eye—like any successful AI algorithm—would require
massive amounts of data in order to function properly and would
have to learn what harassment actually is before predicting its
likelihood.123 Looking for keywords in e-mails is not enough—no one
says “I am going to sexually harass you” in an e-mail. Instead, it
must identify the behaviors and situations that have led to
allegations of harassment. Programmers have trained programs
like Riskcovery and BotlerAI to read publicly available cases and
extract patterns from those,124 but that still requires enough
behavior to make a case. Permitting the program to review internal
HR files and complaints would help it understand what actually
leads to low-level complaints. It would then supplement such a
database, creating a centralized location for the aggregate
scuttlebutt the program distills from corporate chatter.
Taking this a step further, the program could even reach out
of network to comb the internet for all publicly available
information about a company’s employees. It can use an employee’s
photo to identify social networks and map out relationships with coworkers based on extant connections, photos, conversations, tags,
and content interaction. When a Harvey profile interacts with
three-month old content posted by a Sally profile,125 the program re121. Whitney Martin, The Problem with Using Personality Tests for Hiring, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Aug. 27, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/08/the-problem-with-using-persona
lity-tests-for-hiring [https://perma.cc/9JKS-XAU3].
122. A profile that negatively impacts a person’s career would easily lay the basis
for a lawsuit.
123. Data is why AI has evolved so exponentially over the last five years. People
put more information online than ever before, and an AI becomes better at tailoring
its predictions when it has more data. Dave Gershgorn, Five Years Ago, AI Was
Struggling to Identify Cats. Now It’s Trying to Tackle 5000 Species, QUARTZ MEDIA
(Apr. 11, 2017), https://qz.com/954530/five-years-ago-ai-was-struggling-to-identifycats-now-its-trying-to-tackle-5000-species/ [https:// perma.cc/72NX-MXWB].
124. BOTLER AI, https://botler.ai/ [https://perma.cc/KLM7-5UDL]; Riskcovery,
supra note 99.
125. See the story supra Section I.
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asses the risk of harassment, and potentially spits out a warning to
HR.126 HR then may choose—or, if company policy dictates, will be
required—to step in before harassment occurs. The Eye would track
this network on a massive scale, monitoring the behavior and
relationships of potentially thousands of employees. 127
However, the building blocks of such a program are rife with
legal issues.128 This program ranks people based on subjectivity to
sexual harassment; categorizes them as potential victims and
harassers; consolidates mounds of highly sensitive, private
information into one central location; and, perhaps most
worryingly, potentially punishes people for acts never committed.
The true limitation of such a program, then, is probably not
technological. It is legal and, as discussed in the next section, those
implications raise the most pressing issues concerning the adoption
of a program like The Eye.
IV. “The Call of Higher Duty”: AI’s Implications for Notice,
Prevention, and Privacy
“Blessed is the man who expects nothing, for he shall never be
disappointed.”129

Any AI program meant to predict and prevent sexual
harassment—whether it looks like The Eye or something
completely different—must exhibit three features. (1) An early
warning system permitting intervention prior to an official report;
(2) mapping and categorization of an organization’s employees; and
(3) consumption of massive amounts of data.
A. Resurrecting the Duty to Prevent
As discussed above, the Ellerth/Faragher defense requires
employers use reasonable care to (1) prevent and (2) correct

126. Professor Richard Paul kindly referred to this as a “de Haan warning,” which
is certainly more palatable than “thought crime.”
127. Such a victim-focused solution would also permit HR to check in with the
potential harassed to ensure they have not perceived any harassment and help build
trust between HR and employees.
128. One could probably transplant the basic components of the author’s program
and put it in a law school exam to test a student’s ability to issue spot.
129. Letter from Alexander Pope to William Fortescue (Sept. 23, 1725), in THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER POPE: CORRESPONDENCE 104 (comp. by John Wilson Croker,
Vol. IX 1886).
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“sexually harassing behavior.”130 Plenty of ink has spilled on the
latter requirement, but the former—despite Title VII’s prophylactic
purpose—remains largely unchanged. Artificial intelligence may
change that by (1) creating a duty to monitor, and (2) expanding an
employer’s duty to warn.
i.

Duty to Monitor

Nearly all federal courts have concluded employers satisfy
their preventative obligations simply by creating and disseminating
anti-harassment policies.131 Judges prefer “concentrat[ing] on
‘simple, quantifiable standards,’” and none exist in sexual
harassment law.132 The EEOC promulgated guidelines for
prevention but, beyond requiring that employers develop a
reporting system and train employees about sexual harassment,
there is little meat to the regulation.133 So, as long as the policy is
not utterly ineffectual or issued in bad faith, reasonable care is
exercised simply by disseminating a sexual harassment policy. 134
Despite some recent movement towards examining an antiharassment program’s effectiveness,135 nothing incentivizes
employers to do more than implement training and take complaints.
130. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 778.
131. For an excellent survey of these cases, see Lawton, supra note 69, at 217–23.
132. Id. at 213.
133. EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f)
(2019) (“An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassment
from occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees of their right to
raise and how to raise the issue of harassment under title VII, and developing
methods to sensitize all concerned.”). The EEOC’s policy guidance also presents few
answers, stating an effective program should “include an explicit policy against
sexual harassment that is clearly and regularly communicated to employees” and
“encourage victims of harassment to come forward . . . .” Policy Guidance on Current
Issues of Sexual Harassment, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (March 19, 1990),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html [https://perma.cc/9K62-K87W].
134. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (1998); Caridad v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R.,
191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (requiring complaint procedures as part of a policy);
Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“Distribution of an anti-harassment policy provides ‘compelling proof’ that the
company exercised reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting sexual
harassment . . . [t]he only way to rebut this proof is to show that the ‘employer
adopted or administered an anti-harassment policy in bad faith or that the policy
was otherwise defective or dysfunctional.’”); Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d
1167, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001).
135. When New Jersey’s Supreme Court adopted the Ellerth/Faragher defense
for its state’s anti-discrimination law, it very clearly stated that “an employer that
implements an ineffective anti-harassment policy . . . may not assert the affirmative
defense.” Aguas v. State, 107 A.3d 1250, 1268 (N.J. 2015) (responding to the dissent’s
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One possible reason is a lack of alternatives. To many, the best
an employer can realistically do is implement training. It was, for
decades, logistically impossible to monitor every at-work
interaction for potential harassment. But as the price point of
artificial intelligence drops, the behavior necessary to satisfy
reasonable care could change. Tort law regularly adjusts its
standards of reasonable care to include the use of accessible
technology, even when that technology is not customarily used by
businesses.136
Judge Learned Hand famously advocated a mathematical
approach to adjusting standards in tort law—courts should weigh
costs against severity and likelihood of injury.137 And that may very
well be the standard by which a court weighs the reasonableness of
avoiding an AI-based system. Once costs are attainable and
outweighed by injury, the standard could reasonably shift. A duty
to monitor may become the clear standard by which fact-finders
judge a preventative measure’s effectiveness.
This conclusion would, in fact, align the standard more closely
with agency law. The Second Restatement subjects principals to
liability for failure to investigate and warn an agent of
opinion that the defense allows employers to hide behind paper anti-discrimination
policies). Subsequent decisions scrutinized effectiveness a bit more closely than is
typically seen in federal cases. See Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters,
118 A.3d 355, 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (finding that, while the employer
did not seem to monitor the effectiveness of its policies, the fact that managers were
proactive and “initiated contact with plaintiff before he uttered a complaint” showed
the policy was not mere lip service); Smith v. Hutchinson Plumbing Heating Cooling,
No. L-0992-12, 2015 WL 853040, at *7 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 2, 2015)
(“[D]efendant’s proof of lack of training on the policy put its effectiveness in issue
and precluded summary judgment to defendant on the basis of the affirmative
defense.”).
136. See, e.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903) (“What
usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done
is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence, whether it usually is complied with or
not.”); The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1932) (holding tugboat operator
liable for loss of cargo because they did not fit the boat with radio equipment that,
while rarely used in the industry, would have given the boat notice of an impending
storm); Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. NLRB, 624 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1980)
(“The ‘gravity of the resulting injury’ that would occur in the almost unthinkable
event of a serious accident requires the owner of a nuclear facility, acting through its
employees, to exercise extraordinary vigilance at all times.”); Donnell v. Cal. W. Sch.
of Law, 200 Cal. App. 3d 715, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“Depending on location,
building configurations and technology, Cal Western may have the potential to
influence or affect the condition of adjoining property or property at various
distances from its own property. However, the existing legal standard does not
require Cal Western to seek to exert such influence or effect wherever it may have
such potential.”).
137. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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unreasonable risks at the worksite.138 The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) embodies this standard by imposing
a general duty to monitor worksites and prevent hazardous
conditions from developing.139 An AI program that makes
monitoring for sexual harassment as easy as inspecting sites for
hazardous conditions could prompt either the court or the EEOC to
adopt a similar duty to monitor.140
ii. Expanding a Duty to Warn
An interesting side effect to the general blending of the
employer’s dual-obligations to prevent and correct sexual
harassment is the burgeoning appreciation of a “duty to warn.” The
Restatement of Agency Law has noted a master has duty to warn
their servant of imminent harm since 1958.141 It is not surprising,
then, that some courts recognize an affirmative duty to warn about
prior sexual harassment. In Paroline v. Unisys Corp., for example,
the Fourth Circuit explored the different corrective measures a
company could adopt to prevent a known harasser from harassing
again.142 Normally, employers simply fire those who sexually harass
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 471 (1958).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2018); Metzler v. Arcadian Corp., No. 96-60126, 1997
U.S. App. LEXIS 12693, at *12 (5th Cir. Apr. 28, 1997) (“[F]ocus is on an employer’s
duty to prevent hazardous conditions from developing in the employment itself or
the physical workplace.”); Fabi Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1081 (D.
C. Cir. 2007) (“To establish a violation of the General Duty Clause, the Secretary
must establish that: (1) an activity or condition in the employer’s workplace
presented a hazard to an employee, (2) either the employer or the industry
recognized the condition or activity as a hazard, (3) the hazard was likely to or
actually caused death or serious physical harm, and (4) a feasible means to eliminate
or materially reduce the hazard existed.”).
140. OSHA and Title VII are more alike than one may think. Both have a
preventative purpose. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 651 (2018) (“Congress declares it to be
its purpose and policy . . . to assure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions”), with Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (noting Title VII exists “to avoid harm.”); see also
MacKinnon supra note 34, at 159 (laying the basis for finding sexual harassment as
a form of sex discrimination and writing that sexual harassment could actually fall
within the jurisdiction of OSHA).
141. Restat 2d of Agency, § 512 (1958) (“If a servant, while acting within the scope
of his employment, comes into a position of imminent danger of serious harm and
this is known to the master or to a person who has duties of management, the master
is subject to liability for a failure by himself or by such person to exercise reasonable
care to avert the threatened harm.”); see also Newman v. Redstone, 354 Mass. 379,
382 (1968) (noting that, while older jurisprudence refused to recognize an affirmative
duty to warn, “[t]he trend of modern authority . . . is to the contrary”); Paroline v.
Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 112 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing a potential duty to
warn).
142. Paroline, 879 F.2d at 107 (noting that under certain circumstances, the court
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others.143 But if they do not, the Paroline court held past behavior
effectively creates constructive notice for future harassment. 144
Liability could thus attach if a prior-harasser is retained and
harasses again, but the employer failed to warn the new victims. 145
Both the Second and Tenth circuits adopted similar versions of the
rule, similarly reasoning that prior incidents effectively create
constructive notice of future behavior.146
This standard presents the same problem as before—it
requires harassment of someone before triggering a duty. But it
recognizes an employer’s preventative obligations, and more
importantly lays a foundation for a duty to warn. An artificial
intelligence program that monitors employee behavior to predict
sexual harassment would create the same constructive notice as in

may “impute liability, under certain circumstances, to an employer who failed to take
steps to try to prevent sexual harassment of the plaintiff.”).
143. The Paroline court actually tied the plaintiff’s theory to one of negligent
retention. Id. at 112.
144. Id. at 107 (“An employer’s knowledge that a male worker has previously
harassed female employees other than the plaintiff will often prove highly relevant
in deciding whether the employer should have anticipated that the plaintiff too
would become a victim of the male employee’s harassing conduct.”).
145. Id. at 111 (“Paroline’s assertion that the company’s failure to warn caused
her injury, as well as the fact that Moore met Paroline at work, might be grounds for
holding that the injury arose out of her employment.”). Although the court did not
expressly recognize a duty to warn, subsequent decisions clarified what the Fourth
Circuit dubbed “the Paroline failure-to-warn theory.” See Foster v. Univ. of Md.Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 255–56 (4th Cir. 2015) (stating that the rule
“articulated in Paroline remains good law in this Circuit”). That court further
explained that an employer has “an affirmative duty to prevent sexual harassment,
and will be liable if they ‘anticipated or reasonably should have anticipated’ that a
particular employee would sexual harass a particular coworker and yet ‘failed to take
action reasonably calculated to prevent such harassment.’” Id. at 255. However, “for
purposes of the Paroline failure-to-warn theory, an employer may reasonably rely
upon the findings of a state civil rights agency in determining whether an employee
poses a risk of creating a hostile work environment”; thus, if a state agency found no
evidence of wrongdoing, there is no affirmative obligation to warn. Id. at 256.
146. Compare Hirase-Doi v. U.S. W. Commc’ns Inc., 61 F.3d 777, 783 (10th Cir.
1995) (“We believe that US West may be put on notice if it learns that the perpetrator
has practiced widespread sexual harassment in the office place, even though US
West may not have known that this particular plaintiff was one of the perpetrator’s
victims.”) and Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Delta
had notice of Young’s proclivity to rape co-workers. The fact that Young’s prior rapes
were not of Ferris but of other co-workers is not preclusive.”), with Longstreet v. Ill.
Dep’t of Corr., 276 F.3d 379, 382 (7th Cir. 2002) (refusing to adopt a duty-to-warn
standard and reasoning it would be unjust “that a response which seemed to be
within the realm of reasonableness in one situation can, if ultimately it did not have
the proper deterrent effect, be the sole basis for liability in another case even if the
employer’s response in the second case was clearly sufficient.”).
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Pauline, the employer would be obligated to not only investigate,
but also correct the aberrant behavior.
B. Duty to Investigate
But assume no court ever expands an employer’s preventative
duties. Instead, something a bit more plausible occurs; employers
adopt a company-wide monitoring system for more selfish reasons.
Lawsuits are expensive, and the company prefers to nip any
potential issues in the bud before a complaint is filed. 147 Or perhaps
the company expands surveillance to protect its proprietary
information.148 Could that trigger any affirmative obligations for
the employer?
There is no clear answer, but—depending on the information
the AI reviews and the reports it sends to management—an
employer might be obligated to investigate. Employers are dutybound “to take prompt corrective action that is ‘reasonably
calculated to end the harassment’” once they receive notice of such
behavior.149 Currently, both actual and constructive notice demands
harassment occur before any duty is triggered. Actual notice
manifests once a report is filed, while constructive notice exists
when harassment “takes place so openly and frequently that the
employer would be expected to have observed the conduct.” 150
147. Courts are also willing to admit evidence of harassing comments about a
plaintiff, even when the plaintiff is not present to hear them. See, e.g., Schwapp v.
Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The district court also erred in
failing to consider the eight additional [racially-charged] incidents that did not occur
in Schwapp’s presence.”); Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep’t, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d
Cir. 1999) (“a plaintiff may show that, while she was not personally subjected to
harassing conduct, her working conditions were nevertheless altered as a result of
witnessing a defendant’s hostility towards other women at the workplace.”);
Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 336 (6th Cir. 2008) (“This court’s
caselaw therefore makes clear that the factfinder may consider similar acts of
harassment of which a plaintiff becomes aware during the course of his or her
employment, even if the harassing acts were directed at others or occurred outside
of the plaintiff’s presence.”). This evidentiary problem also incentivizes employers to
fully monitor all chatter.
148. A system, not unlike the one described for sexual harassment, is being used
for this exact purpose. Adam K. Levin, You’re Being Watched at Work, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 16, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/success/tca-you-re-beingwatched-at-work-20180416-story.html [https://perma.cc/49QU-EL56].
149. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184, 1192 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807 (1998).
150. J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81
VA. L. REV. 273, 317 (1995); see also Hrobowski v. Worthington Steel Co., 358 F.3d
473, 478 (7th Cir. 2004) (“However, an employer could be charged with constructive
notice where the harassment was sufficiently obvious.”).
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Courts seem willing to stretch the ‘open and frequent’ element
of constructive notice when an employer monitors its employee’s
digital activity. The New Jersey Superior Court held in Blakey v.
Continental Airlines that employers are not obligated to monitor emails, but “may not disregard the posting of offensive messages on
company or state agency e-mail systems when the employer is made
aware of those messages.”151
This obligation has expanded slightly post-Blakey. In Doe v.
XYC Corp., the network administrator at a company that regularly
monitored network activity for inappropriate behavior discovered
an employee was visiting pornographic sites. 152 The department
performed a limited investigation but never reported the
behavior.153 As it turned out, the employee was also visiting sites
with child pornography, which the IT administrators could easily
discover with a more extensive review.154 But it was not until the
employee abused a co-worker’s child that anyone realized the extent
of his behavior.155 The defendant claimed they had no idea he was
accessing child pornography.156 However, the court imputed
knowledge to the employer because “an investigation” of his illicit
browsing “would have readily uncovered the full scope of
Employee’s activities.”157 Since the company had constructive
knowledge of this activity, it was obligated to report the behavior to
the police and either terminate the employee or take some other
“internal action to stop [the employee’s] activities.”158
The old axiom that “hard cases make bad law” undoubtedly
applies in this context. Viewing and creating child pornography is
such a vile act that courts are more willing to push the boundaries
of notice and duty. But there is a noticeable trend towards
expanding the concept of notice when employers monitor an
employee’s activity. If someone who is duty-bound to report
harassment to their employer sees—or could easily access a report
151. Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, 751 A.2d 538, 551 (N.J. 2000) (“That does not mean
that employers have a duty to monitor employees’ mail. Grave privacy concerns are
implicated . . . . It may mean that employers may not disregard the posting of
offensive messages on company or state agency e-mail systems when the employer
is made aware of those messages.”).
152. Doe v. XYC Corp., 887 A.2d 1156, 1159 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1161.
155. Id. at 1161–62.
156. Id. at 1162.
157. Id. at 1167.
158. Id. at 1167–68.
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identifying—potential problems, the court might find the employer
on notice.159 Notice rules “control incentives to invest in
information.”160 Accurate information is worth investing in when it
impacts the bottom-line.161
Under the current regime, investing in harassmentmonitoring software is ill-advised since it might needlessly trigger
investigations that would otherwise be unnecessary. However, as
the cases out of New Jersey demonstrate, behavior both on and off
a work terminal contribute equally to constructive notice. That
creates an incentive to adopt a system that flags issues and permits
corrective action. The risk-averse will want as comprehensive of a
system as possible.
C. The Thirst for Data
Effective AI requires access to extraordinary amounts of
data.162 Without that access, it is nearly impossible to identify
patterns and predict behavior. And employers are uniquely situated
as they can institute massive systems of surveillance otherwise
frowned upon when done by most Americans. 163 Courts do consider

159. Debord v. Mercy Health Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 657 (10th Cir. 2013)
(“Her Facebook post was not in accordance with Mercy’s otherwise flexible reporting
system for sexual harassment complaints, and the post, by itself, did not provide any
notice to Mercy. Only when Weaver himself brought the post to [the HR Director’s]
attention did Mercy learn that, among many other complaints, Debord disliked
Weaver’s ‘creepy hands.’”); see also Fisher v. Mermaid Manor Home for Adults, LLC,
192 F. Supp. 3d 323, 329–30 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (noting an employer’s failure to take
remedial action after seeing an Instagram post that “compar[ed] Plaintiff to a
fictional chimpanzee from the Planet of the Apes movie, created a hostile work
environment” as the employer “knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.”);
Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC, 865 F.3d 922, 931 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Generally,
for constructive notice to attach, the notice must ‘come to the attention of someone
who . . . has under the terms of his employment . . . a duty to pass on the information
to someone within the company who has the power to do something about
it.’ . . . Once that person learns of the sexual harassment, the employer is considered
to be on notice even if the victim never reported the harassment.”).
160. Verkerke, supra note 150, at 319.
161. This idea was recently explored by Kate Klonick. Kate Klonick, The New
Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L.
REV. 1598 (2018). Klonick concluded that companies tend to self-regulate and push
for accurate content because obscenity, inaccuracies, and violence threaten
“potential profits based in advertising revenue.” Id. at 1627.
162. See generally GOODFELLOW ET AL., supra note 88 at 5–8 (noting that AI often
need to be coded and experience their own learning to be most effective).
163. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act prohibits the interception of
electronic data and communication. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018). However, there is a
carve-out for communications made on equipment furnished by a company to a user
“in the ordinary course of its business.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (2018).
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whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, and the
method and manner of the invasion.164 But generally, as long as the
employee is on notice and the business either owns the data or has
an agreement permitting access to data held off-site, the only
problems that stand in the way of permitting access are potential
rather than concrete.
i.

Privacy Problems

As mentioned in Section III, a predictive AI could potentially
access publicly available information posted by employees. But
there are a host of privacy concerns in such a program and, as there
is an implicit right to privacy in the U.S. Constitution, courts may
be wary about such an intrusive act.165 Currently, nothing prohibits
employers from trawling public information. A handful of states
statutorily restrict employers from requesting social media
passwords,166 but generally, any information posted online is
deemed public.
Courts are typically unwilling to protect information in which
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. 167 And once you
release information publicly, you cannot reasonably expect it
remain private.168 But, as the Supreme Court recognized in United
States v. Jones, “[i]n the pre-computer age, the greatest protections
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory, but
practical.”169 Now, “many ordinary Americans are choosing to make
164. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 762 (2010) (“[T]he extent of an
expectation [of privacy] is relevant to assessing whether the search was too
intrusive.”).
165. Cf. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890) (discussing how the courts respond to claims of breach of privacy).
166. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40x
(2019); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/10 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135
(2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:5 (2019).
167. See United States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2019) and Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
168. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). The
First Circuit Court of Appeals recently affirmed a conviction for possession of child
pornography based on photos the defendant posted to an online image board. United
States v. Morel, 922 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2019). Morel argued that he had a reasonable
expectation of privacy as to the images he uploaded, and the Government thus
violated the Fourth Amendment by reviewing the images without a warrant. Id. at
7–8. The Court disagreed, finding Morel had no “reasonable expectation of privacy
in the images uploaded to Imgur” as “‘everyone in the world can see’ images uploaded
to public Imgur albums, and that those images are available on Imgur’s public
galleries.” Id. at 10.
169. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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public much information that was seldom revealed to outsiders just
a few decades ago,” but fail to realize the implications of that
behavior.170 Something as innocuous as where someone ate lunch,
or what they wore to the beach, “can lead to insights of a deeply
sensitive nature,” thanks to pattern recognition and AI.171
Of course, these Fourth Amendment cases do not constrain
private employers.172 Rather, civil liability in tort law typically reins
in abusive behavior.173 But a similar type of analysis applies in this
context, as courts normally examine whether “a plaintiff reasonably
expected that information about himself would remain ‘private’
after” disclosing it to other people.174 Though highly
underdeveloped, the cases examining this issue typically turn on
the affirmative acts the plaintiff-employee took to protect the posted
information.175
In Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean, for example, a nurse sued her
ex-employer for invasion of privacy after the hospital terminated

170. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 408 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
171. Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 399, 420–21 (2017).
172. Some courts have analogized a party’s reasonable expectation of privacy
enforceable against a private employer to the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Twigg v. Hercules
Corp., 185 W. Va. 155, 159 (1990). But, generally, there is reticence to “transfer the
jurisprudence of the cases involving government employers to actions against private
employers.” Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 625 (3d Cir. 1992); see
also Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714, 718 (Tenn. 1997) (collecting case
law holding “that constitutional guarantees restrain government conduct and
generally do not restrain the conduct of private individuals.”); Whye v. Concentra
Health Servs., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137142, at *59 (D. Md. Sep. 24, 2013) (rejecting
an invasion of privacy argument based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence after
noting that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an
arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative.”) (alteration in
original) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989)).
173. Additionally, some states also have statutory protections for personal and
private information. For example, California’s Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
effective January 1, 2020, may require employers who adopt a system that combs
and collects data about its employees to put those employees on notice of the practice.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (2019).
174. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L.
REV. 919, 921 (2005).
175. See, e.g., Meyers v. Siddons-Martin Emergency Grp. LLC, No. 16-1197, 2016
WL 5337959, at *3–*4 (E.D. La. Sep. 23, 2016) (dismissing an invasion of privacy
claim brought against the plaintiff’s former employer after the plaintiff was
terminated for offensive Facebook posts discovered after the employee logged into
his account “on a computer that was owned by Siddons-Martin,” as that act removed
any “reasonable expectation of privacy” he had over his posts); Ehling v. MonmouthOcean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (D.N.J. 2012).
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her, in part, for a controversial statement she made on Facebook. 176
Ehling premised her claim on the fact the post was not public;
rather, anyone who was not “invited to be her Facebook
‘friend,’ . . . could not access and view postings on [her] Facebook
‘wall.’”177 Monmouth-Ocean moved to dismiss, arguing anyone she
added as a Friend could read the post, and thus she never expected
it to remain private.178 The court denied the motion, finding the fact
Ehling “actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from public
viewing” shows she could have “had a reasonable expectation that
her Facebook posting would remain private.”179 However, courts
have also found even the simple act of posting waives any
expectation of privacy, as there is always a possibility those within
the protected space could share the information with others. 180 As
the Ehling court notes, “reasonableness (and offensiveness) are
highly fact-sensitive inquiries.”181
What analysts can glean from the case law, however, is that
an employee who expects information posted publicly—i.e. not just
accessible to friends and followers, but anyone with an internet
connection—to remain private is living in a fantasy. But trying to
peek behind the curtain separating the public from a user’s limited
world of friends and followers might be a step too far.
ii. The Cost of Litigation and Fear
The system this article envisions is supposed to warn; not
accuse. But that distinction gets murky when straddling the line

176. Ehling, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 369–370.
177. Id. at 370.
178. Id. at 372.
179. Id. at 374.
180. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[W]e
do not find a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail communications voluntarily
made by an employee to his supervisor over the company e-mail system
notwithstanding any assurances that such communications would not be intercepted
by management. Once plaintiff communicated the alleged unprofessional comments
to a second person (his supervisor) over an e-mail system which was apparently
utilized by the entire company, any reasonable expectation of privacy was lost.”);
Heldt v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 16-cv-885-BAS-NLS, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25315, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2019) (granting summary judgment on an
invasion of privacy claim brought against a private insurer who disclosed
information gleaned from the plaintiff’s social media page to an insurance
investigator as the plaintiff “voluntarily shared the information with his Facebook
friends knowing there is a possibility that his friends could share the information
with others,” and thus “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
information.”).
181. Ehling, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
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between truth and probability. Interestingly, leaked data alone
should not cause any problems. The data fed into this system is,
again, public facing.182 Anyone with an internet connection could
find and review that information; the system just aggregates it into
one place.183 Rather, the ‘red-flag’ or warning itself is what
threatens the most harm to someone’s reputation if leaked.
Defamation claims are the common road to redress
reputational harm. The warning—“Harvey has a 90% likelihood of
sexually harassing Sally”—seems to state, or at least imply, a
fact.184 Truth remains the absolute defense to defamation, though it
is difficult to argue a warning or probability is entirely truthful.
And, while you could explain how the probability was reached based
on true information, doing so requires cracking the proprietary
black box protecting algorithmic programs. Very few companies
would sacrifice their secrets to help defend against a defamation
suit brought against one client.185
It is more likely that—rather than argue truth—employers
would instead rely on the qualified “common interest” privilege186
that normally helps sink the (admittedly rare) defamation suits

182. Problems could arise, of course, if the information used by the system is not
public. There would be some interplay between an employee’s private information,
as maintained by human resources, and the public facing information compiled for
the system’s analysis. And some states mandate that businesses protect their
employees’ private information. In California, for example, employers must
“implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices” to
safeguard its employees’ “personal information.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (2019).
183. As discussed supra Section IV.C.i, employees face an uphill battle if arguing
information they posted publicly on social media must remain private.
184. Even if it is more opinion than fact, “[a] defamatory communication may
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion . . . if it implies the allegation of
undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 566 (1979). Unless the public knows and understands how an earlywarning system like the one envisioned by this article works, they could reasonably
assume the probability is based on prior acts of harassments, which may or may not
exist.
185. This issue has arisen already with programs used for criminal sentencing.
Eric Loomis was sentenced to six years in prison because “[COMPAS],” a proprietary
algorithm used in sentencing, believed he had a high risk of recidivism. See Adam
Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May
1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-softwa
re-programs-secret-algorithms.html [https://perma.cc/Q29M-FQS2]. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court upheld the sentence, reasoning that while Loomis “cannot review
and challenge how the COMPAS algorithm calculates risk, he can at least review
and challenge the resulting risk scores set forth in the report.” State v. Loomis, 881
N.W.2d 749, 761 (Wis. 2016).
186. Martha S. West, Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Court’s WakeUp Call for Women, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 457, 509 (2002).
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brought by accused-harassers. While defamation law varies from
state-to-state, that privilege generally protects intra-company
communications between employees who share a common interest
in the subject, such as a human resources department concerned
about sexual harassment.187 A warning spat out by the system to
human resources likely falls in the realm of intra-company
messaging.188 However, employers lose that privilege when they
‘excessively’ publish the communication.189 And that is where a
potential leak could be hazardous. Recognizing that some leaks are
inevitable, courts examining an excessive publication challenge
tend to review what an employer did to keep the alleged defamatory
information within the proper channels.190
Inevitably, creative plaintiffs will find other avenues for
vindicating reputational harm caused by an early-warning system.
The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), despite its title,
covers more than credit, encompassing “any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency
bearing on a consumer’s . . . character, general reputation, [or]

187. Id. at 508 (exploring the effect of a qualified privilege, as well as other
defenses, on defamation suits rooted in sexual harassment accusations within
various jurisdictions).
188. California has even codified the qualified privilege if the communication
pertains to alleged sexual harassment. CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (2019) (explaining the
privilege applies “to and includes a complaint of sexual harassment,” as well as a
prior employer’s “decision to not rehire” an employee “based upon the employer’s
determination that the former employee engaged in sexual harassment.”).
189. West, supra note 186, at 510 (“Another possible way for a terminated
employee to prove abuse of the privilege protecting an employer’s workplace
communications is to prove ‘excessive publication’—that the employer distributed
the allegedly defamatory information outside the workplace.”).
190. Garziano v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 818 F.2d 380, 393 (5th Cir.
1987) (remanding a case for the fact-finder to determine whether rumors about an
employee’s termination for alleged sexual harassment were “the product of
supervisors discussing the contents of” an internal communication concerning the
reasons for the termination “with persons outside the ‘circle’ of interested employees,
or whether the rumors were only routine scuttlebutt due to Garziano’s discharge.”);
Esmark Apparel v. James, 10 F.3d 1156, 1163 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding “minor leaks”
caused by supervisors sharing the reasons the company terminated an employee
with “their immediate families” did not evidence “that the company . . . abuse[d] its
qualified privilege through excessive publication”); Tacka v. Georgetown Univ., 193
F. Supp. 2d 43, 51 (D.C. 2001) (“[Q]ualified privilege may be lost . . . ‘if the
publication occurs outside normal channels, is otherwise excessive, or was made with
malicious intent.’”) (quoting District of Columbia v. Thompson, 570 A.2d 277, 292
(D.C. 1990)); White v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass. 809 N.E.2d 1034, 1038
(2004) (holding that the qualified privilege protecting intra-company communication
is “lost only when the employer recklessly makes ‘unnecessary, unreasonable or
excessive’ publications”).
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personal characteristics” collected for “employment purposes.” 191
That includes “evaluating a consumer for employment, promotion,
reassignment or retention as an employee.”192
Indeed, some have already challenged broad ‘risk assessments’
collected for, and produced to, their employers. A technician who
worked for Superior, a third-party installation company, brought
one such claim in Ernst v. Dish Network, LLC.193 Dish Network, the
named-defendant, contracted to have Superior technicians install
satellite dishes for Dish’s customers.194 As part of this arrangement,
Dish required that Superior run criminal background checks on
their employees and forward Dish a “summary report” with “the
individual’s risk rating” denoted as “‘high risk,’ ‘low risk,’ or
‘review.’”195 “High risk” employees, like Ernst, were forbidden from
installing equipment.196 He sued Dish, arguing he had a right to
inspect and correct the report under the FCRA.197 The court
concluded “[a] ‘high risk’ rating on the Summary Report in effect
says that [Plaintiff] . . . has done something highly improper that
impugns his moral character.”198 And because Ernst’s employer
“used the information in the Summary Report . . . for ‘reassignment
or retention as an employee,’” it was subject to the FCRA. 199
As Ernst shows, there is no defense to an FCRA action just
because another entity compiled the report, or the report just
summarizes the information actually collected. Any adopters of an
early-warning system should thus strongly consider producing a
copy of any reports generated to impacted employees.
Unfortunately, this practice could result in higher amounts of selfcensorship as people try to ‘correct’ their ranking by meeting with
fewer opposite sex colleagues, or avoiding mentorship-relationships

191. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2018). Some states have adopted their own versions
of the FCRA. California’s Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA)
requires anyone evaluating publicly-available information concerning a consumer’s
“character, general reputation, personnel characteristics, or mode of living, for
employment purposes” to disclose such information “within seven days after receipt,”
even when the entity forgoes “the services of an investigative consumer reporting
agency.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.53 (2019).
192. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h) (2018).
193. Ernst v. Dish Network, LLC, 49 F. Supp. 3d 377, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
194. Id. at 379.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 378.
198. Id. at 382.
199. Id. at 384 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(h) (2018)).

104

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

with their subordinates.200 The risk of litigation and ensuing side
effects of a massive surveillance effort may prove too high for
implementation. Only time will tell.
V. “Looks Like You’ve Had a Bit Too Much to Think!”:
Conclusions
“We shall meet in the place where there is no darkness.”201

Consider the following an example. There will be, in the not so
distant future, a man named Harvey. 202 Harvey will run a fairly
successful public relations firm with lots of employees, including a
young lady named Sally. Sally will be twenty-one years old, fresh
out of college, and dream of running her own PR firm. Harvey will
take a liking to Sally and offer her an internship. He lets his Human
Resources director Jim know about the new hire and provides a
basic rundown of her job—Sally will shadow Harvey, watch him run
everything, and generally help out around the office. Jim puts these
variables into ‘The Eye;’ a handy system that generally monitors
employee activity and flags potential problems for Jim to review.
At first, there are no real issues—’The Eye’ flags the power
differential between Harvey and Sally, but only predicts a 15%
chance of harassment. However, it began noticing some odd
behavior from Harvey’s work-terminal. Her name kept appearing
in his search history; they tend to clock in and out at around the
same time, even when Harvey stays well past closing; and recently
he started interacting with images Sally posted years ago wherein
she is wearing revealing clothes.203 It sends Jim a warning—Harvey
is now a high-risk harasser. Jim prints out the report and calls
Harvey into his office. He explains how sensitive these matters are,
and lets Harvey know ‘The Eye’ thinks there may be a problem. He
provides Harvey a copy of his report and cautions him to stay away
200. Steve Hendrix, Ellie Silverman & Marc Fisher, #MeToo has a ‘Chilling Effect’
on Workplace Camaraderie, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2018), http://www.chicagotribune
.com/business/ct-metoo-workplace-camaraderie-20180128-story.html [https://perma
.cc/Z5EP-XQ5U]; see also Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061
(2003) (discussing the effect of sex in the workplaces).
201. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 25 (Harcourt Inc. 1977) (1949).
202. Names, characters, businesses, places, events, locales, and incidents are
purely products of the author’s imagination. Any resemblance to eventual persons,
living or dead, or eventual events is entirely coincidental.
203. This feature sold Jim; AI analyzes pixel by pixel, compares it to publicly
available images on the internet of similar skin hue, determines to 99% probability
how many pixels are of skin and how many are clothes, then assesses risk based on
how many pictures are being liked of someone half-naked.
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from Sally. Harvey is annoyed by this—Sally was a nice girl and he
thought they had a real connection—but he agrees and heads back
to his office.
Sally notices Harvey seemed a bit more stand-offish than
usual, so she decides to help out by tidying up early the next
morning. While sorting the paperwork in his office, Sally sees the
report—‘Harvey, CEO; 93% Risk Against Sally; Intervention
MANDATORY.’ Sally could not believe her eyes. She felt betrayed;
Harvey wanted to harass her! She took a picture of the report and
sent it to her friend Jenny, a journalist working on a report
exploring sexual harassment in the modern workplace. Jenny posts
a copy of the report to her blog, and tags everyone she can to out
Harvey as a harasser.
Sexual harassment law is failing the harassed. It was designed
to prevent harassment but cannot protect a victim until they are
actually harmed. As this paper explored, artificial intelligence could
be the key to this problem. As long as the program is tailored to
consider subjective experience, a company could step in and prevent
harm before it ever occurs. Such a system could even capture,
organize, and centralize all of the rumors and complaints that swirl
around a company.
The tricky parts are what employers do with the information
and how employees view the system. Employers should not take any
adverse action unless harassment actually occurs. These warnings
should instead simply prompt an investigation and discussion.
Instead of seeing these reports or scores as accusations, they should
be framed the same as credit scores. Having a low credit score does
not make you a bad person—it simply changes your risk profile. And
once you know your score is low, either because you were called into
human resources or you received a copy of the report, you can work
on making it better. Small, incremental adjustments in attitude and
perception can go a long way in promoting empathy and cutting
back on harassment.

